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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
OSCAR PETERSEN,

Plaintiff and Appellant

-vs.CLAUDE ALKEMA and MRS. CLAUDE
ALKEMA, his wife,

Defendants and Resp-ondents.

SAMUEL C. POWELL
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE

Attorneys for Defendoots and
Respondents
STATEME.NT OF FACTS
The appellant's statement of facts is substantially
correct. However, there are omissions of some material
facts to which we direct the ·Court's attention.
The appellant testified in his deposition that he had
used ladders for the picking of fruit for five or six years
and was familiar with different types of ladders used in
connection with the picking of fruit (PD 8-9).
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"Q. And how rnany years have you been picking
apricots, fruit~
A. Well, I'll say off and on for- rive or six ·years;
sornetiines I'll n1iss· a year, and put in a
rnonth or two wheri 'there wasn't nothing else
to do.

Q. What kind of ladders have you been using,
regular picking ladders~
A.

Regular picking ladders. T'here's two kind~
of picking ladders. One comes up to a point,
and the other one is a square one on top.
That is about the only two- picking ladders I
know about.

Q.

This one con1es up to a

A.

Yes. Comes up to a point, like that (illustrating).

Q.

Three

A.

Yes.

Q.

That is the ordinary ladder used for picking,
is it~

A.

Yes." (PD 8-9).

point~

legged~

On the day in question, the appellant started picking fruit about. 8 :00 A.M. using this ladder continuously
except for a limch period·· (PD· 12). That during such
ti;r:ne: he picked thirty-two (32) bushels- of apricots. (AD
9'-10). The ladder used· by the appellant was· in good conf
dition. The appellant. testified that the. ladder was: not
"rickety" · ( PD 9), and the ladder had been used by respondent Claude Alkema. the day before (AD 6), whose
weight was 240 p.ounds (AD 6). ·

2
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4-\fter the appellant quit \rork, rt\spondent l~laude
.A.lke1na exa1uined the ladder and saw that it 'vas broken
in three plaee~, on one of the ~ide rails. The ste vs were
not broken (. .-\D 1:2). ~rhe ladder "·a~ an ordinary ladder
u~ed in the picking of fruit) being \rhat is designated as
an eight foot ladder ha \·iug threL leg·~ 'rith seven steps in
it, coming to a point at the top. It was of wood con~truction. lT nder each step there was a steel rod attached
to the side rails to brace the ladder and its steps (AD
ti-7) (PD 1:2).
1

Appellant had been using the ladder in the picking
of fruit for about six and one-half (60) hours, except for
the time he "\Yas eating lunch (PD 9) (AD 10).
Prior to appellant's injury, respondent Claude Alkema had told him to quit work (AD 10), and when he
didn't quit, Alkema went down and on his way met the
appellant (AD 11). Appellant told Alkema he had injured his hand (PD 13). Appellant, after asking Alkema
for cold water, in response to a question from Mr. Alkema
as to whether his arm hurt very bad said, "Oh I think
it is just more of a bruise. It will be all right in a day
or two." (AD 11). Appellant poured water upon his
arm himself (PD l±). He did not ask Alkema for medical
aid. A short time after the accident Alkema brought
appellant to Ogden in his automobile and let him out at
24th ~treet and Lincoln Avenue, because the appellant
said he wanted to get out there (AD 14), which place is
a block away from the lVlilner Hotel where appellant was
staying (PD 14). When appellant left Alkema's auto-

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tlnobile, he: did notas;k1for medical aid (AD 14). ·.When he

.w-Qnt ~to th'e JMilner .HoteLhe:did,not.ask:the. clerk;to<ob.tain a doctor .for.hiin (BD 14). He went out that~ evening
to -supper :somewhere on 25th ·Street near the .Milner
)Hotel. He purchased :four bottles of beer. and took ~the
li>eer to:his' roo1n and· dTank the, beer during 'the. night (BD
-lG-lG). The following.Inorning1he ·went to·a coffee:shop
and· ordered ;a 1 cup o·f coff-ee and then saw a polieeman
who took hiln.totthe Dee~Hospital (PD 16). After he:had
been to the hospital and the doctor, he commencetl-to piek
apricots ~gain and worked for two or three d~ys (PD
17.). He went back tos_ee.the doctor once.(PD 1~).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
The points .upon which respondents rely to sustain
the judgment(nf the District Court.are;as·iollo-~.:
Point ·1-The _pleadings and depositions .show that
there 'is -no genuine ·issue as to any material 'fact and
the .:facts dis-closed ·by the pleadings and depositions
bring ·the 'Case squarely- within ·the ''simple tool'' ·rule,
th-erefore, respondents· are -entitletl to a summary -,jutlgment~as:a 'matter of ;law ron -theJfirst\cause --of a~tion.
·point 2--The pleadings and depositions show that
there 'is no genuine "issue a.s to any material fact ana
under the facts ·disclosed by the pleadings ana a~po
sitions no aetionable negligence on ·the part 'df re·
spondents ca.n be found and, ·thererore, respondents
are entitled 1to ·a -summary judgment ·as ·a ·matter ·of law
on .the seconu cause ·of· action.
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.A.RGUMENT
ln the Di8triet Court hearing it \vas stipulated by
the parties in open Court that the deposition of the appellant and the deposition of the respondent Claude Alken1a
be published, read and considered by the Court. ArguInents by counsel for appellant and respondents on the
law w·ere fully heard and considered by the Court. No
genuine issue as to any Inaterial fact is disclosed by the
pleadings and depositions and the District Court rendered sUlillnary judgment as a Inatter of law in favor
of respondents on both causes of action. This it could
do without findings under Rule 56 (c), and Rule 52 (a).
Rule 52 (a) provides :
". . . Findings of fact and conclusions of law
are unnecessary on decisions of motions under
rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b)."
Rule 41 (b) has no application in this case.

POINT 1
THE PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS SHOW THAT
THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT AND THE FACTS DISCLOSED BY THE PLEADINGS
AND DEPOSITIONS BRING THE CASE SQUARELY WITHIN THE "SIMPLE TOOL" RULE, THEREFORE, RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.

The appellant at the time of this accident was a mature man, being fifty-eight (58) years of age, and was of
sufficient intelligence and rnenta.l capacity to appreciate

5
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danger. lie was familiar with the use of fruit picking
ladders, having used thein for 1nore than fiiVe (5) years.
The type of fruit picking ladder which he was using is
generally and connnonly used in fruit picking. It is siulple in construetion so the defects, if any, therein could
be discovered without skill or knowledge and without
intricate inspection. The appellant chose the ladder at
the beginning of his work, set it up, tried it, and found
that it was not "rickety." He used this ladder in picking
apricots continuously for a period of six and one-half
hours, with the exception of a short lunch period, rnoving
it from tree to tree. He, of necessity, went up and down
it during his picking and prior to the accident he ·had
picked thirty-two (32) bushels of apricots. If there were
any defects in the ladder they n1ost certainly could have
been discovered by the appellant in his examination and
use of this ladder. The appellant was as well qualified
as the re~pondents to detect any defects, if any, in the
ladder and to judge of the probable danger of using
it. The respondent Claude Alkerna had used this ladder
hirnself the day before, he being a,rnuch larger man than
the appellant.
Under these facts and circumstances, it is c_lear t~t
this case comes squarely within the rule of law known
as the "Sirnple Tool" rule. The rule was recognized and
appl_ied by this court in the case of Proctor v. Town Cl~b,
Inc., l05 Utah 72, 141 Pac. 2nd 156. In that case the ·elnployer furnished the plaintiff with a stepladder for the
purpose of hanging drapes. This stepladder suddenly

6
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split and collapsed, causing the injuries co1nplained of.
This Court held that the stepladder "'"as in tJ1e class of
ordinary shnple tools, applied the siiuple tool rule and
held against the plaintiff.
The Court through Justice McDonnough quoted the
rule as laid down in the case of Ne,vbern v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 4 Cir., 68 F. 2d 523, 91 ALR
784, as set forth in appellant's brief at page 19 thereof.
Appellant in his brief at page 22 thereof seeks to
rely upon a comment made by Justice McDonnough in
the Proctor case to the effect that it may be assumed
without deciding that even as to a simple tool a master
who furnishes to .his workmen regularly employed, such
tool as an incident of his ·regular business, has the duty
of prudently inspecting it or be liable for injuries resulting from defects which inspection .would have revealed.
This comment can have no application to the case at bar,
because the appellant does· not allege or claim that inspection would have revealed the defect, nor was the
appellant a workman regularly employed, being a transient fruit picker engaged only during the portion of one
day.
We call the ·court's attention to paragraph 111, subdivision c of appellant's first cause of action of his complaint as shown on page· 3 of his brief. In that paragraph
of his complaint appellant himself alleges that the· breaking of the ladder was "sudden, unusual and unexpected.''
In addition we agam call attention to the fact that respondent, Claude Alkema had himself . used the ladder

'l
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the day before and the appellant had the ladder in his
posse'Ssion and custody and had been using it for some
six. and one-half. hours ..
In Proctor v. Town Club, sup-ra, this Court cited
with approval the Michigan case of Nichols v~ Bush 291
Mich. 473, 289 N.W. 219; and the Michigan case· of Kelley
v. Brown 262 Mich. 356, 247 NW 900. These Michigan
cases are cited and the simple tool doctrine followed
in the recent Michigan case of Rule v. Giuglio 7 N.W. 2nd
227;·145 A.L.R. 5.37.. In tha~ case the plaintiff was employed by defendent to p·aint window frames, sash and
eaves of defendant's house. Part of the work was paint~
ing around the attic windows above the sun porch.. De~
fendant furnished the plaintiff with an extension ladder
consisting of two separate sections, each.between 12 and
16 feet in length. riaintiff had used the ladder in doing
part. of the painting of defendant's house. He was using
one section in painting around the attic windows when
it broke on one side at the rung. Defendant, who weighed~
245 pounds, testified that he, a .few days prior to the accid~nt, h~d used the ladder in washing the windows.of his
house. The Court held in favor of· the defendant, holding that the ladder was a simple tool and that the . case
came within the. simple tool rule. The Court, at page 229
of 'the Northwestern Reporter, adopts ·the following state-·
ment of the simple tool doctrine:
"Where the tool is simple in construction, so
-that defects therein can be discovered without
special skill or knowledge and without intricate in-

8
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spection, the servant is as well qualified as anyone else to detect defects and to judge of the probable danger of using such tool while defective;
and, the tool being in the possession of the servant, his opportunity for inspection is better than
that of the master."
This case we submit is clearly in point with .the case at
bar.
In the case of Olsen v. Ken1 Temple, Ancie11t Arabic
Order of the_Mystic Shrine (North Dakota), 43 NW (2)
385, the plaintiff was decorating the interior of a p·avilion
preparatory to a social function given by defendant.
There was a wire running lengthwise through tlie cente-r
of the, building fro~ 15 to 16 feet above the floor. The
defendant's ladder was used.by the plaintiff. T-he plaintiff set the· ladde1· under the wire and while attaching
p~per streamers· to the wire he fell fr()m the_ ladder and
was injured. He had moved the ladder in p·ntting up the
streamers during· the period .of an hour prior to the accident. The step tipped and he fell. Plaintiff had never·
used the ladder prior to the morning of his injury. In
th~ maj·ority opinion at page 387 the court say-s :
"It is the general rule that an employer is
bound· to use. ordinary care: to furnish his em. ployees with reasonably safe and proper tool~
and appliances with which to work. (Citing cases
and. texts.) ·
"This rule of general liability is subject to
a widely recognized exception. Where the tool or
appliance is simple in construction and a defect
therein is discernible without special skill or

9
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knowledge, and the employee is as well qualified
as the employer to detect the defect and appraise
the danger resulting therefrom, the employee may
not recover damages from his employer for an in. j~ry due to such a defect that is unknown to the
employer ...
· '-'The great weight of authority is to the effect
that an ordinary portable stepladder is a simple
tool or .appliance within the rneaning of the simple
tool doctrine. (Citing cases among which is the
Kelley and Nichols cases in Michigan, supra.)
"In Etel v. Grubb, 157 Wash. 311, 288 Pac.
931, the Supreme Court of W ~shington refused to
apply the·simple tool doctrine in a stepladder case.
In Puza Hennecke Co. 158 Wise. 482, 149 NW 223;
the Court held that a stepladder was a place to
work and declined to apply the simple tool doctrine. We agree with the.majority of Courts that
an ordinary portable stepladder i_s a simple tool
ot appliance and that the employee, who uses it,
is . usually as well qualified to detect any defect
therein as is the employer who furnishes it.
"The ladder in question may have been somewhat longer than the average stepladder, but it
was otherwise of usual construction and there is
no intimation that the height of the ladder in any
way contributed to the accident. The plaintiff
was several steps from the top when he fell. He
set up the ladder in the first inst:;tnce and ascended and descended some eight times over a
period .of about an hour prior to the accident."
This case is also squarely 'in point. We again call
the court's attention to the fact that the plaintiff was

10
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"·ell acquainted ",.ith fruit picking ladders and had been
using the ladder for sou1e six and one-half hours prior
to the accident.

The appellant at page 20 of his brief, cites the Ol~en
case supra, but relies entirely upon the dissenting opinion in the ca~e, \Yhich, of course, \ras not the decision of
the Court.
The case of Rule v. Giuglio, supra, is reported in the
.A.meriean La\v Reports .A. nnotated and following the
report at 145 A.L.R. 5-!2, there is an extensive annotation on the subject entitled '~Ladder as ~simple tool within simp(l.e tool doctrine."
At page 543 the Annotator states:
·~under

ordinary circurnstances a connnon
wooden ladder is a sirnple tool or appliance within
th-e meaning of the simple tool doctrine.".
Cases are then cited fro1n 15 jurisdictions and some
of them ·discussed. At page 549 ··of the annotation, the
Annotator says :
'•It has been held that a stepladder is a sin1ple
tool or appliance within the simple tool doctrine."
He cites cases from a number of jurisdictions and discusses some of them.
The appellant relies upon the Washington case ~f
Etel v. Grubb, supra, but this case is contra~·y to the
weight of authority in the United States as shown by
the Olsen case, supra, and by the A.L.R. annotation,

ll
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supra, and, of course, is also contrary to our Utah law
as laid down in the Proctor v. Town Club case, supra,
which recognizes and applies the simple tool rule.
The appellant at page 24 of his brief cites the -utah
case of Reynolds v. American F·oundry & Machine Conlpany ______ Utah ------, 239 Pac. 2nd 209. That case is not a
simple tool case. It involves an injury to the employee
of an independent contractor, who was injured when a defective link separated in a chain. The chain was being
used to hoist a six ton core of a transformer and the
chain had not been subjected to weight proof test. The
simple tool doctrine is not discussed at all and it is obvious that the case is not in point with the case at bar.
At page 23 of his brief the appellant quotes fron1
the California case of Moran v. Zenith Oil Company
206 Pac. 2nd 679~ That is not a simple tool case and hence
not in point.
In any event it could have no application to this
case because it speaks of a liability
"If it is shown that the employer, licensor,
or proprietor knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the defect and
has failed to effect a repair thereof or to warn
the workman."
Respondent, Claude 'Alkema, used the ladder the day
before, no defect, of course, was known to him, nor could
he have discovered any by the exercise of any reasonable
care, and the appellant had been using the ladder for

12
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1uany

ihOUitS

\vhile .picking thirty-two {32) bush:els 'of

aprieots.

-POINT·-2
THE ·PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS 'SHOW 'THA'r
TH"ElRE "'IS .-No .GENUINE .ISSUE AS .TO AN.Y :MATERI-:AL
FACT AND UNDER THE FACTS DISCLOSED 1BY THE
PLEADINGS AND DEPOSITIONS NO ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS CAN BE FOUND
AND, THEREFORE, RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A
.SUMMARY JUDGMENT 'AS .A :MATTER·.OF.LAW~ON THE
,SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION .

.The app_ellant. has. stated the~:general rule that there
i~ no du~y -q.pon the e~ployer to render_ medicaleare and
assistance to the employee. It .is stated on_page. 26 of his
brief- in the case of Szabo v. ·Pennsylvania- R. Co. {N.")J.,
40 Atl. (2) 562, 563, and·the opinion then states an excep4tion :to ·the rule. This exception ·orily applies ',when ~he
:injured employee is ·rendered helpless--so that. he eannut
p1·ovide for ;his, own care. This l:eXC€ption Lto Lthe ._rule ::ffi
_stated .on p~e 27 of ~appellantJs -brief. The Jacts _._in this
ea~e do not eo me ~within the,_ exception. This is. substantiated by .tlte testimony of the appellant himself in his
deposition. Appellant testified that he had told the respondent, Claude :....t\.lkema, 'he 'had injured his arm and
asked hin1 -for sorne water or soinething -cold. 'Th-at the
-appellant hi1n-self got-some. coJd.water/and·poured~it upun
·his at·m ,an·d :that _.Alkema 2also ~did ·the ··same, rtliing 'for
hin1 .(PD il4). The . appellant also .testified· .that after.
going to-the Milner Hotel he_had gone.to the<drl!g.stor~
around the _corner and .that he had purchased some liniment and had also put cold water upon the injured part

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that night (PD 14). He made no effort to get in touch
with the doctor himself or to have a doctor call at the
hotel, or to ask the clerk of the hotel to obtain a doctor
for him (PD 14). He stated that he had purchased four
bottles of beer to take to his roorn, in case that there was
too much pain, which he drank during the night (PD 1516).
It must be remembered that the injury did not render the appellant helpless. Alkerna testified he rendered
first aid treatrnent to hirn. It was only a short tin1e after
the accident that Alkema took him in his automobile to
Ogden. He brought him to Ogden to a point at the corner of 24th Street and Lincoln Avenue a block away
from appellant's hotel (AD· 14). Appellant made no
effort to get medical assistance for himself, nor did he
request Alkema to obtain it for him (AD 14). He quit
work at approximately 2 :30 in the afternoon and upon
his return to Ogden could have gone to a doctor's office
that afternoon within a short time after the injury, which
he failed to do. It cannot be contended, therefore, that
the facts in this case come within the exception to the
rule, as the appellant was not rendered helpless nor was
there at anytime strict necessity nor urgent exigency. To
what extent this exception to the general rule has become
established in law is doubtful. We quote from 35 Arnerican Jurisprudence, paragraph 109, pages 537-8:

14
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··LI..\BILI'l"Y FOR lNJ.URY 'fO EMPLOYE:bj FOR WANT OF CARE. Inas1nuch as the
relationship of. en1ployer and e1nployee does not
in1pose upon the fornter a legal obligation to care
for the ailing or injured eu1ployee, the e1nployer,
in the absence of special agree1nent or statutory
requireinent, 111ay not be held liable for injury
\vhich has been suffered by the e1nployee because
of a vvant of 1nedical or surgical treatment; this
is true although the necessity for professional
attendance or treatn1ent has arisen by reason of
conduct \vhirh renders the en1ployer liable to the
e1nployee. Accordingly, it has been held that a
railroad con1pany n1ay not be held liable for having failed to carry to his home an employee whose
feet have been, frozen by exposure while in the
course of his eu1ployn1ent. However, in some
states there seen1s to have existed for some tin1e
a general opinion that railroads should furnish
aid to injured en1ployees, and the trend of authority seems to impose upon the employer a general
duty to care for an en1ployee who has, while engaged in perfornling the services of his employnlent, become incapable of caring for himself.
When an employee has, by unforeseen accident to
himself, while engaged in · the line of his duty,
been rendered helpless, the dictates of humanity,
duty, and fair dealing demand that the employer
if cognizant of the injury furnish medical assistance. Of course, this duty should rest upon the
employer only in extraordinary cases, where immediate medical or surgical assistance is imperatively required to save life or avoid further serious bodily injury. It is one which arises out of
strict necessity and urgent exigency. The duty
arises with the emergency, and with it expires."
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Summary Judg-

.

ment of the District Court is correct as a matter of law
and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

SAMUEL C. POWELL
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE
Attorneys for Defend.arnts and
Respondents
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